Laura Marquez-Garrett, SBN 221542
laura@socialmediavictims.org
SOCIAL MEDIA VICTIMS LAW CENTER
600 1st Avenue, Suite 102-PMB 2383
Seattle, WA 98104
Ph: 206-741-4862

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

[Additional counsel appear on signature page.]

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David W. Slayton,
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SARAH HARKEN, individually and as successor-in-interest to LILLEE JOYCEANN HARKEN WILKINS, Deceased (from Colorado); CHARLES HILL, individually and as successor-in-interest to ZEN MARCHAND-HILL, Deceased (from Wyoming); JOSEPH IGUNBOR, individually and as successor-in-interest to SOFIE IGUNBOR, Deceased (from Illinois); C.C. and G.M. (from New York); P.H. and S.B. (from Texas); D.H. and N.H. (from Michigan); C.C. and M.W. (from Illinois); S.D. and M.D. (from Alabama); C.K. and L.K. (from Illinois); DEVIN MISICKA (from California); OLIVIA PARSONS (from Florida); I.F. (from North Carolina); WESLEY KONNERUP (from Washington); TRISTAN RUSSELL (from Colorado); GRANT SMITH (from California); E.W. (from Pennsylvania); MIA PEREZ (from California); and NIA COLQUITT (from Illinois),

Plaintiff(s),

v.

META PLATFORMS, INC.; INSTAGRAM, LLC; FACEBOOK PAYMENTS, INC.; SICULUS, INC.; FACEBOOK OPERATIONS, LLC; SNAP, INC.; BYTEDANCE, LTD.; BYTEDANCE, INC; TIKTOK, LTD.; TIKTOK, LLC; TIKTOK, INC.; GOOGLE LLC; YOUTUBE, LLC; DISCORD, INC.; ROBLOX CORPORATION; and DOES 1-50,

Defendant(s).

CIVIL ACTION NO. 26SMCV04677

COMPLAINT

JURY DEMAND

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Children are suffering an unprecedented mental health crisis on a global scale.

2. This crisis has been building since the first decade of the twenty-first century, shortly after Defendants META PLATFORMS, INC., INSTAGRAM, LLC. FACEBOOK PAYMENTS, INC., SICULUS, INC., FACEBOOK OPERATIONS, LLC (collectively, "Meta"), SNAP, INC. ("Snap"), BYTEDANCE, LTD., BYTEDANCE, INC, TIKTOK, LTD., TIKTOK, LLC, TIKTOK, INC. (collectively, "ByteDance" or "TikTok"), GOOGLE LLC and YOUTUBE, LLC (collectively, "Google" or "YouTube"), DISCORD, INC. ("Discord"), and ROBLOX CORPORATION ("Roblox") began designing, manufacturing, and distributing addictive, defective, and dangerous social media products and features.

3. Defendants knew that their social media products were defective and/or inherently dangerous and marketed to and aimed them at children. In the words of Defendant Meta Platforms Inc., "the young ones are the best ones. You want to bring people to your service young and early."[1]

4. Defendants then engaged in calculated and extensive efforts to deceive consumers about the risks and benefits associated with use of their products, while exploiting young people into compulsive and inherently harmful patterns of use. Borrowing heavily from the behavioral and neurobiological techniques used by slot machines and the cigarette industry, these companies deliberately embedded in their products an array of design features aimed at maximizing youth engagement to drive advertising revenue.

5. Defendants know children are in a developmental stage that leaves them particularly vulnerable to the addictive effects of such features and Defendants targeted them because of this.

6. The defects in Defendants' products vary by platform, but all exploit children and adolescents. They include but are not limited to an artificial intelligence driven endless feed to keep users scrolling in an induced "flow state," "intermittent variable rewards" that manipulate dopamine delivery to intensify use, "trophies" to reward extreme usage, metrics and graphics to exploit social comparison, incessant notifications that encourage repetitive account checking by manufacturing

[1] *State of Arizona, et. al. v. Meta*, N.D. Cal., Complaint filed Nov. 22, 2023, ¶ 68.

insecurity, inherently harmful programming designed to prioritize engagement over safety including by matchmaking adult strangers with vulnerable youth, invasive collection of private data and then disclosure of that data to strangers, inadequate and essentially illusory age verification protocols, and deficient tools for parents that create the illusion of control.

7. Defendants' choices have generated extraordinary corporate profits—and yielded immense tragedy. In the United States alone, suicide rates for youth are up an alarming 57% and emergency room visits for anxiety disorders are up 117%. By 2019, one in five high school girls in the United States had made a suicide plan, and, by 2021, one in three had seriously considered suicide. Children and families around the world have struggled to cope with the severe, lasting damage inflicted on them by Defendants in the form of exploitation, anxiety, depression, eating disorders, substance use disorders, suicidal behaviors, and death.

8. This lawsuit follows on a growing body of scientific research, including Defendants' own internal studies, which draws direct lines between Defendants' conscious, intentional design choices and the youth mental health crisis spreading across the world like wildfire. In the words of Facebook's first founding president, Sean Parker, Defendants designed their products to "consume as much of your time and conscious attention as possible," knew that they were taking risks with "children's brains" and "did it anyway."[2]

9. Disconnected "Likes" replaced the intimacy of adolescent friendships; mindless scrolling displaced the creativity of play and sport; children became products bought and sold by the small handful of companies amassing unprecedented money and influence seemingly overnight.

10. Defendants relentlessly pursued a strategy of growth-at-all-costs, recklessly ignoring the impact of their products on children's mental and physical health and well-being. In a race to corner the "valuable but untapped" market of tween and teen users, Defendants designed product features to promote repetitive, uncontrollable use by kids.[3]

[2] Mike Allen, *Sean Parker unloads on Facebook: "God only knows what it's doing to our children's brains"*, AXIOS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.axios.com/2017/12/15/sean-parker-unloads-on-facebook-god-only-knows-what-its-doing-to-our-childrens-brains-1513306792.

[3] Georgia Wells & Jeff Horwitz, *Facebook's Effort to Attract Preteens Goes Beyond Instagram Kids, Documents Show*, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2021, 11:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-instagram-kids-tweens-attract-11632849667; *see also* Haugen 00022339.

11. And their strategy paid off.

12. Users of their products now number in the billions, and the frequency and time spent by these users has grown exponentially. This has allowed Defendants to harvest a vast amount of personal user data—from the school you attend, to the sneakers you covet, to the places you've been and the people you've met – which, in turn, has allowed Defendants to mint a fortune.[4]

13. Defendants' growth, however, came at the expense of their most vulnerable users: children. The children at issue in this complaint and their families are not merely the collateral damage of Defendants' choices but are the direct victims of intentional product design.

14. As a direct result of Defendants' successful promotion of their defective products, the rates of mental health issues among children have climbed steadily since 2010. By 2018, suicide was the second leading cause of death for youth.[5]

15. In December of 2021, the United States Surgeon General, Vivek Murthy, recognized the Defendants' dangerous designs and their abdication of responsibility for resulting harms:

> In these digital public spaces, which are privately owned and tend to be run for profit, there can be tension between what's best for the technology company and what's best for the individual user or for society. Business models are often built around maximizing user engagement as opposed to safeguarding users' health and ensuring that users engage with one another in safe and healthy ways . . . .
>
> **[T]echnology companies must step up and take responsibility for creating a safe digital environment for children and youth**. Today, most companies are not transparent about the impact of their products, which prevents parents and young people from making informed decisions and researchers from identifying problems and solutions.[6]

16. Then, on June 17, 2024, Surgeon General Murthy warned the world again, writing that, "The mental health crisis among young people is an emergency — and social media has emerged as an important contributor."[7] He now is calling for the U.S. Congress to "require a

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[4] *See* Snap, Inc., 2022 Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 15 (Jan. 31, 2023) ("[W]e rely heavily on our ability to collect and disclose data[] and metrics to our advertisers so we can attract new advertisers and retain existing advertisers. Any restriction or inability, whether by law, regulation, policy, or other reason, to collect and disclose data and metrics which our advertisers find useful would impede our ability to attract and retain advertisers.").

[5] Melonie Heron, *Deaths: Leading Causes for 2018*, 70(4), Nat'l Vital Statistics Reports 1, 10 (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr70/nvsr70-04-508.pdf.

[6] U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory, *Protecting Youth Mental Health* (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-youth-mental-health-advisory.pdf (emphasis in original).

[7] Vivek H. Murthy, *Surgeon General: Why I'm Calling for a Warning Label on Social Media Platforms*, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/17/opinion/social-media-health-warning.html#.

surgeon general's warning label on social media platforms, stating that social media is associated with significant mental health harms for adolescents" and urging for legislation to reign in the incredible harms these companies are causing to our youth,

> Legislation from Congress should shield young people from online harassment, abuse and exploitation and from exposure to extreme violence and sexual content that too often appears in algorithm-driven feeds. The measures should prevent platforms from collecting sensitive data from children and should restrict the use of features like push notifications, autoplay and infinite scroll, which prey on developing brains and contribute to excessive use.
>
> Additionally, companies must be required to share all of their data on health effects with independent scientists and the public — currently they do not — and allow independent safety audits. While the platforms claim they are making their products safer, Americans need more than words. We need proof.[8]

17. These statements by the Surgeon General are in line with a substantial body of peer-reviewed scientific literature documenting the harmful impact that Defendants' products have on our children, including the various injuries suffered by the children in this Complaint. First, it is important to note that for years these companies have prevented the scientific community and governments around the world from gaining access to the types of data needed to understand the impacts of their designs and business decisions on consumers – all while conducting their own studies, confirming evidence of product-caused harms, and then using from those studies information that might increase revenue and growth while often disregarding consumer safety. Second, even limited by the near insurmountable hurdles these companies have erected, this body of emerging research demonstrates that Defendants' defectively designed products ***can*** cause the harms plaguing children across the world: addiction and/or compulsive use, anxiety, depression, eating disorders, body dysmorphia, self-harm, sexual exploitation, substance use disorders, suicidal thoughts, and even death.

18. Defendants knew about the risks; could have fixed their products to avoid the harms and at little cost; could have warned parents and the public about the dangers of their designs; but instead, chose to stay the course and convince consumers that their products were safe, fun, and age-

[8] *Id*.

appropriate for the world's youth instead.

19. Plaintiffs now bring this action for personal injuries and, where applicable, wrongful death, against Defendants for harms caused because of their platforms and wrongful conduct, including: (a) designing defective products that caused serious injuries to users; (b) failing to provide adequate warnings about serious and reasonably foreseeable health risks from product use; (c) failing to utilize reasonable care in, among other things, developing, designing, managing, operating, testing, producing, labeling, marketing, advertising, promoting, controlling, selling, supplying, and distributing their products; and (d) engaging in deliberate concealment, misrepresentation, and obstruction of public awareness of serious health risks to users. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants acted with intent and willful disregard for human life.

II. THE PARTIES

A. PLAINTIFFS

20. This Complaint is filed by 19 plaintiffs across 12 different U.S. states (including Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming), on behalf of children ranging in age from 13 to 24 years old and who suffered personal injuries due to their use of Defendants' products (collectively, "Plaintiffs").

21. Plaintiffs have been harmed as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful conduct. These harms include pain, suffering, disability, impairment, disfigurement, death, an increased risk of injury and other serious illnesses, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society, aggravation or activation of preexisting conditions, scarring, inconvenience, incurred costs for medical care and treatment, loss of wages and wage-earning capacity, and other economic and non-economic damages, as set forth herein. These losses often are permanent and continuing in nature.

22. Plaintiffs expressly disaffirm any contract they may have made with Defendants, or that Defendants may claim they made with them, before reaching the age of majority, as they lacked capacity to contract.

B. DEFENDANTS

23. The defendants identified in this section are collectively referred to as "Defendants" throughout this Complaint.

1. Meta

24. Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. ("Meta Platforms") is a Delaware corporation and multinational technology conglomerate. Its principal place of business is in Menlo Park, CA.

25. Meta Platforms' subsidiaries include, but may not be limited to, the entities identified in this section, as well as a dozen others whose identity or involvement is presently unclear.

26. Defendant Facebook Payments, Inc. ("Facebook 1") is a wholly owned subsidiary of Meta Platforms that was incorporated in Florida on December 10, 2010. Facebook 1 manages, secures, and processes payments made through Meta Platforms, among other activities. Its principal place of business is in Menlo Park, CA.

27. Defendant Siculus, Inc. ("Siculus") is a wholly owned subsidiary of Meta Platforms that was incorporated in Delaware on October 19, 2011. Siculus constructs data facilities to support Meta Platforms' products. Its principal place of business is in Menlo Park, CA.

28. Defendant Facebook Operations, LLC ("Facebook 2") is a wholly owned subsidiary of Meta Platforms that was incorporated in Delaware on January 8, 2012. Facebook 2 is likely a managing entity for Meta Platforms' other subsidiaries. Meta Platforms is the sole member of this LLC, whose principal place of business is in Menlo Park, CA.

29. Defendant Instagram, LLC ("Instagram, LLC") launched an app called Instagram in October 2010. On or around April 7, 2012, Meta Platforms purchased Instagram, LLC for over one billion dollars and reincorporated the company in Delaware. Meta Platforms is the sole member of this LLC, whose principal place of business is in Menlo Park, CA.

30. Meta Platforms, Instagram, Siculus, Facebook 1, and Facebook 2 are referred to jointly as "Meta."

31. Meta owns, operates, controls, produces, designs, maintains, manages, develops, tests, labels, markets, advertises, promotes, supplies, and distributes digital products available through mobile- and web-based applications ("apps"), including Instagram and Facebook (together,

"Meta products"); Messenger; and Messenger Kids, as well as well as the virtual reality (VR) headset, Oculus. Meta's apps and devices are widely distributed to consumers throughout the United States.

2. Snap

32. Defendant Snap, Inc. ("Snap") is a Delaware corporation. Its principal place of business is in Santa Monica, CA.

33. Snap owns, operates, controls, produces, designs, maintains, manages, develops, tests, labels, markets, advertises, promotes, supplies, and distributes the app Snapchat. Snapchat is widely available to consumers throughout the United States.

3. ByteDance

34. Defendant ByteDance Ltd. is a global company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Its principal place of business is in Beijing, China. ByteDance Ltd. also maintains offices in the United States, Singapore, India, and the United Kingdom, among other locations.

35. ByteDance Ltd. wholly owns its subsidiary Defendant ByteDance Inc., a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Mountain View, CA.

36. ByteDance Ltd.'s key Chinese subsidiary is Beijing Douyin Information Service Limited, f/k/a Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd. ("Beijing ByteDance").[9] Beijing ByteDance owns, operates, and holds key licenses to Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok. On or around April 30, 2021, the Chinese government took a 1% stake in, and received one of three seats on the board of directors of, Beijing ByteDance.[10] Specifically, 1% of Beijing ByteDance is now owned by WangTouZhongWen (Beijing) Technology, which in turn is owned by China Internet Investment Fund (China's top Internet regulator and censor), China Media Group (China's national broadcaster, controlled by the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda department), and the Beijing municipal government's investment arm.

[9] *See* Sophie Webster, *ByteDance Changes Names of Subsidiaries to Douyin, Speculated to be Mulling an IPO*, Tech Times (May 8, 2022), *available at* https://www.techtimes.com/articles/275188/20220508/bytedance-changes-names-subsidiaries-douyin-speculated-mulling-ipo.htm.

[10] *See* Juro Osawa & Shai Oster, *Beijing Tightens Grip on ByteDance by Quietly Taking Stake, China Board Seat*, The Information (Aug. 16, 2021), *available at* https://www.theinformation.com/articles/beijing-tightens-grip-on-bytedance-by-quietly-taking-stake-china-board-seat?rc=ubpjcg.

37. ByteDance Ltd. wholly owns its subsidiary Defendant TikTok, Ltd., a Cayman Island corporation with its principal place of business in Shanghai, China.

38. TikTok, Ltd. wholly owns its subsidiary Defendant TikTok, LLC which is, and at all relevant times was, a Delaware limited liability company.

39. TikTok, LLC wholly owns its subsidiary Defendant TikTok, Inc. f/k/a Musical.ly, Inc. ("TikTok, Inc."), a California corporation with its principal place of business in Culver City, CA.

40. Defendants TikTok, Ltd.; TikTok, LLC; TikTok, Inc.; ByteDance Ltd.; and ByteDance Inc. are referred to jointly as "ByteDance."

41. ByteDance owns, operates, controls, produces, designs, maintains, manages, develops, tests, labels, markets, advertises, promotes, supplies, and distributes the app TikTok. TikTok is widely available to consumers throughout the United States.

4. Google

42. Google Inc. was incorporated in California in September 1998 and reincorporated in Delaware in August 2003. In or around 2017, Google Inc. converted to a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant Google, LLC (together with its predecessor-in-interest Google Inc., "Google"). Google's principal place of business is in Mountain View, CA.

43. Since 2006, Google has operated, done business as, and wholly owned as its subsidiary Defendant YouTube, LLC ("YouTube, LLC"). YouTube, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in San Bruno, CA. YouTube is widely available to consumers throughout the United States.[11]

44. On October 2, 2015, Google reorganized and became a wholly owned subsidiary of a new holding company, Alphabet Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View, CA.

45. Google, LLC and YouTube, LLC (together, "Google") are alter egos of one another: together and in concert they own, operate, control, produce, design, maintain, manage, develop, test,

[11] *See, e.g.*, Alphabet Inc., *Form 10-Q*, Oct. 25, 2022, at 4 (defining Alphabet as "Alphabet Inc. and its subsidiaries."), *available at* https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204422000090/goog-20220930.htm.

label, market, advertise, promote, supply, and distribute the app YouTube.

5. Discord

46. Defendant Discord, Inc. ("Discord") is a Delaware corporation. Its principal place of business is in San Francisco, CA.

47. Discord owns, operates, controls, produces, designs, maintains, manages, develops, tests, labels, markets, advertises, promotes, supplies, and distributes the app Discord.

6. Roblox

48. Defendant Roblox Corporation ("Roblox") is a Delaware corporation. Its principal place of business is in San Mateo, CA.

49. Roblox owns, operates, controls, produces, designs, maintains, manages, develops, tests, labels, markets, advertises, promotes, supplies, and distributes the app Roblox.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

50. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they are incorporated in and have their principal places of business in California, and because they have contacts with California that are so continuous and systematic that they are essentially at home in this state. All Defendants regularly conduct and solicit business in California, provide products and/or services by or to persons here, and derive substantial revenue from the same. All Defendants affirmatively and extensively engage with a significant percentage of this State's residents through messages, notifications, recommendations, and other communications.

51. There is no federal jurisdiction in this case. All claims are brought pursuant to California state law. There are no federal causes of action and Plaintiff expressly disclaim any federal causes of action.

52. Venue is proper in Los Angeles County because one or more defendants are headquartered here and/or one or more Plaintiffs reside here; in addition, Plaintiffs will be relating this case to and filing a Short Form Complaint in Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 5255 ("JCCP 5255"), which proceeding is pending in Los Angeles County.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS SPECIFIC TO EACH DEFENDANT

A. GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL DEFENDANTS

53. On May 15, 2023, a Master Complaint was filed in JCCP 5255, on May 15, 2023 ("Master Complaint"), in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and adopt Sections IV.A.1 through IV.A.7 of the Master Complaint as though set forth in full herein.

54. Defendants purposefully designed their products to act with children on the same neurological pleasure circuitry as is involved in addiction to nicotine, alcohol, or cocaine. They know that they are causing these harms and continue to do so despite such knowledge, and children around the world are suffering terrible harms as a direct result. As explained in the article, "Has Social Media Fuelled a Teen-Suicide Crisis," published in The New Yorker on September 30, 2024,

> Social media acts on the same neurological pleasure circuitry as is involved in addiction to nicotine, alcohol, or cocaine. Predictable rewards do not trigger this system nearly as effectively as unpredictable ones; slot-machine manufacturers know this, and so do social-media companies. "Teens are insatiable when it comes to 'feel good' dopamine effects," a Meta document cited in the attorneys general's complaint noted. Instagram "has a pretty good hold on the serendipitous aspect of discovery. . . . Every time one of our teen users finds something unexpected their brains deliver them a dopamine hit." Judith Edersheim, a co-director of the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior, at Harvard, likens the effect to putting children in a twenty-four-hour casino and giving them chocolate-flavored bourbon. "The relentlessness, the intrusion, it's all very intentional," she told me. "No other addictive device has ever been so pervasive."

B. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TO META

55. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and adopt Section IV.B (and all applicable subsections) of the Master Complaint as though set forth in full herein.

56. Facebook founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, designed and launched The Facebook in February 2004. At the time, it included a number of basic safety features, which made sense given the intimate nature of the platform. Zuckerberg was constructing a virtual space and wanted college students to be incentivized to share photos and personal updates with peers.[12]

[12] *See, e.g.*, Brittany Kasko, *Mark Zuckerberg was a college student when he co-developed the social media platform*, FOX NEWS (Feb. 4, 2024, 12:02 AM), https://www.foxnews.com/lifestyle/this-day-history-feb-4-2004-harvard-student-mark-zuckerberg-launches-the-facebook. For example, The Facebook was limited to college students, and access required verification via a school issued email address. This verification process would also have presumably prevented students from being able to open multiple accounts.

57. While the social aspect of The Facebook was a new concept, the platform otherwise functioned like other apps at the time. It was something that college students used and not the other way around. They could use it to search for and look people up, and view individuals to whom they were now virtually connected. But then things changed, or rather, Meta changed them.

58. Meta and its founders recognized an opportunity to not just make money, but to make unprecedented amounts of it by turning consumers into the product and advertisers into customers.

59. In September 2006, Meta began allowing anyone over 13 to sign up and by October 2009, Meta had switched its feed features from chronological sorting to algorithmic ranking.

60. Meta has failed and/or refuse to be transparent as to how it is programming these technologies; while internally, it has repeatedly acknowledged the harms these decisions are causing to children. None of this is about content, but instead, involves product features and settings as nuanced as algorithm speed. For example, on information and belief, Meta has known for years that if it simply gave young users the option to slow the speed of the content recommendation algorithm at night, many of those children would be able to sleep. Instead, Meta continues to design and distribute its product in a manner intended to manipulate children into doom scrolling for hours, and during times they are supposed to be sleeping or in school.


61. Rather than warn consumers about the potential risks of using its product, however, Meta (and the handful of companies that emerged in this new industry) began convincing consumers and governments around the world that their innovation would change our lives for the better. That their products would connect countries and people across the globe, all while using the most advanced technologies to ensure a safe and healthy experience for their users, including children.

62. They fueled this optimism with credible assurances and technologies no one else understood, or even knew existed; and spent more than a decade making promise after promise about the utility, safety, and benefit of their products.

63. However, and as admitted in 2017 by Facebook's first founding president, Sean Parker (in an interview that got curiously little notice), he, Zuckerberg, and the other founding bros of social media "designed these products to "consume as much of your time and conscious attention as possible … And that means that we need to sort of give you a little dopamine hit every once in a

while …"[13] Parker admitted that they set out to exploit "vulnerability[ies] in human psychology," that they did so knowing the risk that it might be harmful "to our children's brains" and that even though all of them "… understood this consciously … we did it anyway."[14]

64. Meta product development decks literally include photographs of brains, created by neuroscientists and others Meta hires to work on product development. The following illustration is just one example, in which Meta examines the brain development process throughout childhood, identifying how this makes children "very vulnerable" – then examines various design-level changes Meta might make to better capture the attention of young minds.[15]



65. These allegations and more are evidenced in the Meta documents that have made their way into the public record over the last two years.[16]

C. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TO SNAP

66. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and adopt Section IV.C (and all applicable subsections) of the Master Complaint as though set forth in full herein.

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[13] Mike Allen, *Sean Parker Unloads on Facebook: "God only knows what it's doing to our children's brains,"* AXIOS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.axios.com/2017/12/15/sean-parker-unloads-on-facebook-god-only-knows-what-its-doing-to-our-childrens-brains-1513306792.

[14] *Id*. This is the same addiction mechanism as tobacco. *See Nicotine: It's why smoking is so addictive*, Health and Social Services, Government of Northwest Territories of Canada, https://www.hss.gov.nt.ca/en/services/health-effects-tobacco/nicotine-it%E2%80%99s-why-smoking-so-addictive ("Nicotine causes the release of dopamine in the brain, which gives people a good feeling."). Only, whereas Big Tobacco targeted adults and young adults, Meta targeted teens and tweens.

[15] *See Why Teens and Young Adults Choose Insta*, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23322855-copy-of-copy-of-why-teens-and-young-adults-choose-insta_sanitized (last accessed Oct. 8, 2024).

[16] *See, e.g.,* https://gizmodo.com/facebook-papers-how-to-read-1848702919; https://www.documentcloud.org/projects/facebook-papers-210748/; fbarchive.org.

67. Snap's founders, Evan Spiegel, Reggie Brown, and Bobby Murphy, sought to create a platform that could be used to facilitate the types of conversations and activities that people would not want to exist in digital perpetuity. The concept for Snapchat arose from a 2010 incident in which one of Snap's founders, Reggie Brown, sent a photo that came back to haunt him.

68. The celebrated origin stories of Snapchat, while easily dismissed as college hijinks, illustrate how central the transmission of illicit and illegal activity was to the product at inception. In fact, the desire to avoid evidence of illicit and illegal activities was a design imperative to Snapchat's creators. For example, as an officer of Kappa Sigma fraternity at Stanford in 2009 and 2010, using traditional email and social media, Mr. Spiegel discussed "making 300 Jell-O shots to get sorority girls drunk, urinating on one conquest and shopping for cocaine and marijuana."[17]

69. Plaintiffs agree that the youthful indiscretions and college hijinks of corporate leaders and government officials generally are beyond the legitimate scope of civil litigation or politics. However, Mr. Spiegel's communications promoting the purchase of cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol to ply upon minors occurred at the same time he was designing the Snapchat product.

70. On information and belief, a motivation for Snapchat's disappearing feature – not just disappearing as between users but either not created or deconstructed on the back end as well – was to facilitate such activity and provide cover for those engaged in illicit and illegal conduct. After its launch in 2011, one of Snapchat's founders proposed targeting it to mature audiences for its intended purpose – as a sexting tool. A draft of a press release written in 2011 reads, "Picaboo lets you and your boyfriend send photos for peeks and not keeps!"[18]

71. Despite this intent and foreseeability of how Snapchat could and would be misused,

[17] Andrea Chang, *Snapchat CEO Evan Spiegel 'mortified' by leaked frat emails*, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2014, 12:55 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snapchat-evan-spiegel-20140528-story.html.

[18] J.J. Colao, *The Inside Story of Snapchat: The World's Hottest App Or A $3 Billion Disappearing Act?*, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2014/01/06/the-inside-story-of-snapchat-the-worlds-hottest-app-or-a-3-billion-disappearing-act/?sh=3c52f29467d2. *See also* Nick Bilton, *Disruptions: Indiscreet Photos, Glimpsed Then Gone*, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2012, 5:24 PM), https://archive.nytimes.com/bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/disruptions-indiscreet-photos-glimpsed-then-gone/?_r=0 ("The app's description in the Apple App Store does not mention sexting. But the accompanying images are of scantily clad women, and Apple has designated the app as being for users 12 and older, warning of 'mild sexual content or nudity.' Mentions of the app on Twitter indicate that many young people use it for photo-based banter with friends, though there are references to its less innocent potential.").

Snap's founders decided to target and market it children and teens.[19] Snap's founders did not decide this because they believed that their product was in any way appropriate or safe for children and teens; but rather, because it was a path to riches in an industry dominated by only one or two other social media products at the time. Snap had to do something big and different to succeed.

72. Snap has worked hard to maintain the kid-friendly image that makes it so popular among children, lulling consumers and parents into a false sense of security. In the words of one Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) detective,

> In my experience, Snapchat is by far the most popular online platform when it comes to criminal misconduct and kids. It is easy to download and appears harmless to many parents who see the application on their children's devices and have no idea how dangerous it is. The parents to whom I have spoken generally associate Snapchat with silly filters and kids being able to connect with friends, and not with things like encrypted messaging and strangers.[20]

73. Likewise, Snap's failure, inability, and/or or refusal to cooperate with law enforcement and failure, inability, and/or refusal to utilize information in its possession to enforce its own Terms of Use has resulted in incredible harms to children across the world. In the words of one former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Assistant Special Agent in Charge,

> Snap has a tip line where anyone can submit complaints about harmful content such as child pornography, human trafficking, or bullying in order to have Snap either deactivate or suspend an account if it is found to violate their policies. But then the account will quickly reconstitute, often using the exact same pictures and a similar name. I can't tell you how many times I have seen this.[21]

74. In another case, a police officer exchanged the following texts with a grieving mother whose son died in September 2020 as the result of connections Snapchat made, "I have tried calling but there is no one to call. This is by design because Snapchat doesn't like dealing with police."[22]


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[19] *See* Colao, *supra* note 18 (explaining that by Fall of 2011, Snap's founders noticed that its userbase were school-aged kids who used the app primarily between the school hours of 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.).

[20] Declaration of Investigator Claude Dobbs, ¶ 3, filed October 5, 2023, in *Neville et. al. v. Snap*, *Inc.* (L.A. Sup. Ct.), Case No. 22STCV33500 ("*Neville et. al. v. Snap*").

[21] Declaration of Donald Im, ¶ 25, filed October 5, 2023, in *Neville et. al. v. Snap*.

[22] Declaration of Perla Mendoza, ¶ 7, filed October 5, 2023, in *Neville et. al. v. Snap*.



75. These are just a few of many, many examples.[23]

76. In truth, Snap ensures that there is no real way for parents to even learn what Snap is doing – what products it is distributing to their children, how it has designed and programmed those products to target and addict children, or the fact that Snap is the one facilitating, encouraging, and making connections between young users and adult strangers.

77. Snap may *look* different from some social media products. For example, it does not utilize a publicly viewable bulletin board format like Instagram or Facebook. However, Snap's use of this visual difference between products to claim that Snapchat is safer than Instagram and Facebook when, in fact, Snap actively is connecting children to predatory Snapchat users to increase its own engagement, is unfair, deceptive, false, and misleading.

D. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TO TIKTOK

78. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and adopt Section IV.D (and all applicable subsections) of the Master Complaint as though set forth in full herein.

79. TikTok is a social media product designed to be used by children and actively marketed to children across the world. Its commercials, featured both on television and the internet, feature things like families dancing and dogs jumping in the air.

80. TikTok does not, however, design its product to be safe for children and/or free from dangerous defects.

81. On December 14, 2022, the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) published a report titled "Deadly by Design," which illustrates how "TikTok pushes harmful content promoting

[23] *See, e.g., Neville et. al. v. Snap*, SAC, filed July 21, 2023.

eating disorders and self-harm into users' feeds."

82. TikTok's defects are not about third-party content, but rather, design and programming decisions. TikTok is targeting and inundating minors with content meant to addict them to its product, at the expense of their health and well-being. TikTok could make its product safer for those consumers without ever removing a single piece of content.

83. On information and belief, companies like TikTok and Google know when dangerous challenges are being amplified and targeted at children as direct result of their design, programming, and operational decisions. Such knowledge, control, and contribution are just one major difference between the products at issue and these lawsuits, developed starting in the first decade of the 21st-century, and the types of products and online services that existed prior.

84. For example, and on information and belief, when these companies become aware of such dangerous challenges, they will engage in detailed internal discussions. They recognize that challenges can result in harm to children, including death, yet make decisions in terms of how to react and/or respond to such harms that disregard such safety considerations – for example, on information and belief, choosing to wait and see and/or be reactive rather than proactive even when they know that such decision may result in the death of children.

85. Similarly, on information and belief, companies like TikTok exercise so much power and control over what consumers see and think, that when confronted these kinds of real-world harms occurring on and because of their platform-related decisions, instead of addressing them head on, they consider strategies like convincing the world that the death of children resulting from use of their platforms is a hoax. They know or have reason to know that this is not the truth, but once again, prioritize their own business interests over child safety.

86. On October 26, 2021, for example, TikTok VP and Head of Public Policy at Americas, Michael Beckerman, testified before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee that "As it relates to TikTok, this is not content that we've been able to find on our platform … actually, the content does not exist on the platform … we have not been able to find any evidence of a blackout challenge on TikTok at all. And again, it would violate our guidelines." On information and belief, TikTok later had to correct and/or qualify that statement as TikTok is and

was aware of the blackout challenge having been on TikTok.

87. Of course, all of this should be viewed in light of the fact that another of these Defendants, Meta, has argued in multiple lawsuits across the country that these companies have a First Amendment right to lie to Congress. *See, e.g., State of Vermont v. Meta Platforms, Inc., et al.,* Case No. 23-CV-4453, Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, dated January 19, 2024 ("There is a separate claim here that Meta's alleged lies in testimony before Congress constitute actionable misrepresentations under the Consumer Protection Act. Meta argues that these are protected by the First Amendment right to petition the government."). They do not; but if governments do not act and ensure and enforce reasonable regulations, they will continue to do so.

88. TikTok knows that its algorithms are promoting and amplifying harmful content to children and teens and are operating with a degree of algorithmic discrimination that is particularly harmful to TikTok's most vulnerable user groups – our children

E. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TO GOOGLE

89. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and adopt Section IV.E (and all applicable subsections) of the Master Complaint as though set forth in full herein.

90. Plaintiffs further allege that YouTube radicalizes its users. YouTube's advertising-powered business model is geared towards user engagement, which is maximized by triggering users' preexisting biases in video recommendations. YouTube's recommendation algorithm is designed to optimize user activity and engagement on the platform by personalizing recommendations based on users' past exposures and content viewed or shared by other similar users. However, in the case of political content, YouTube's algorithmic recommendations reinforce users' political biases, ultimately leading to radicalization.

91. Users with certain beliefs tend to interact with social media content that is consistent with those beliefs. Users are more likely to select content that aligns with their preexisting beliefs than otherwise. This tendency may polarize people's attitudes and generate hostility toward different racial, ethnic, religious groups, and social and political ideologies.

92. In 2022, ADL's Center for Technology & Society conducted a nationally representative survey of YouTube users measuring demographic characteristics and political

attitudes such as age, race, education, partisanship, ideology, political knowledge, and interest.[24] In addition to survey data, the study monitored participants' browser history and activity data.

93. Using comprehensive individual-level behavioral data, ADL found that exposure to alternative YouTube channels can serve as gateways to extremist or white supremacist channels, which are disturbingly common among a group of Americans.

94. ADL found that exposure to videos from extremist or white supremacist channels on YouTube was very common. Approximately one in ten participants viewed at least one video from an extremist channel (9.2%) and approximately two in ten (22.1%) viewed at least one video from an alternative channel. When participants watched extreme videos, they were more likely to see and follow recommendations to similar extremist videos. A third (29%) of YouTube recommendations accompanying videos from extremist channels were to other videos of the same type.

95. As a result, many racially resentful people are not only watching large numbers of videos from alternative or extremist channels but also are shown recommendations for more such videos when they do so, furthering their progression to extremism.

96. ADL's findings demonstrate that YouTube plays an important role in exposing people to extremist content.

97. ADL's survey-based determination that YouTube radicalizes right-leaning users is consistent with computer science research at the University of California Davis. Researchers there conducted a systematic audit of YouTube's recommendation system using a 100,000 proxy accounts with different ideological profiles to determine the presence of ideological bias and radicalization in which recommendations progressively more extreme.[25] Researchers reviewed 15,323,930 YouTube videos spanning 111,715 unique channels, and they found that YouTube's recommendations do in fact direct users – especially right-leaning users – to ideologically biased and increasingly radical content on both homepages and in up-next recommendations.

98. The UC Davis researchers found that YouTube's homepage recommendation

[24] Annie Y. Chen et al., *Exposure to Alternative & Extremist Content on YouTube,* ADL (2022).
[25] Muhammad Haroon et al., *YouTube, The Great Radicalizer? Auditing and Mitigating Ideological Biases in YouTube Recommendations* arXiv:2203.10666v2 [cs.CY] 25 Mar 2022.

provided viewers with right leaning profiles more right-leaning recommendations than centrist viewers received centrist recommendations. This demonstrates that the recommendations for the right leaning viewer are not only significantly different from the center baseline but are even more ideologically biased than the recommendations of the other viewers.

99. Similar radicalization tendencies were found in YouTube's Up Next Recommendations. Researchers found increased ideological bias in the up-next recommendation trials compared to the homepage. The prior ideological bias of the You Tube user influences influence their up-next recommendations which increases the chances that the user will continue watching ideologically biased content.

100. The Davis researchers demonstrating that over time YouTube's algorithms direct users to progressively more ideologically radical and extreme videos in their YouTube sessions.

101. Since YouTube's inception Google has failed to adequately warn young users or their parents about the mental and physical risks its products pose.

102. These risks include, but are not limited to, product abuse and addiction and radicalizing exposure to racism, antisemitism, violence, and other harms.

F. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TO DISCORD

103. Discord is an on-line social media product that was launched in 2015. The product includes a number of features that allow users to set up accounts and communicate with other product users through group and private means, including video calls, text messaging, and exchange of photos and videos. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discord.

104. Discord's product design promotes harmful dependencies and radicalization.

105. Discord's users engage in public and private chats or channels, called servers, on varying topics. The vast majority are private, invite-only spaces with fewer than 10 people. All servers are private by default, and only channels with more than 200 members are discoverable in its search tool. Discord utilizes real time notifications and other features designed to make it difficult for vulnerable consumers to look away.

106. Discord's users engage in public and private chats or channels, called servers, on varying topics. The vast majority are private, invite-only spaces with fewer than 10 people. All

servers are private by default, and only channels with more than 200 members are discoverable in its search tool.

107. Teens on Discord can connect with people they don't know if the stranger was invited by someone else in the room or if the channel link is dropped into a public group that the user accessed. By default, all users – including teens – can receive friend invitations from anyone in the same server, which then opens up the ability for them to send private messages.

108. Discord in particular is popular for communities of neo-Nazis and white supremacists to socialize, share hateful memes, boost the ideas that undergird their movements, inculcate strangers, and plan activities that take place elsewhere online.

109. BuzzFeed News reported on a chat server called "/pol/Nation" where more than 3,000 users participate in a rolling multimedia chat extravaganza of Hitler memes, white nationalist revisionist history, and computer game strategy.[26] In a voice-over-IP chatroom within the server, users keep up a steady chatter about the same subjects. A separate server called "Thunderdome" hosts the enthusiastic staff and fans of the Daily Stormer, a neo-Nazi website.

110. Slate was able to join more than 20 communities on Discord in a single afternoon that were either directly about Nazism or white supremacy or reveled in sharing anti-Semitic and racist memes and imagery.[27]

111. Slate noted that Discord differs from other social media platforms in that chats are entirely opt-in, meaning that the potential for unsolicited public harassment is significantly lower. Slate concluded that this design feature, in addition to the anonymity in Discord's design, makes it an ideal recruitment tool for white supremacists to attract followers to their racist ranks.

> Unlike Stormfront—where people who are obviously interested in hate groups go—on Discord a lot of the participation comes from people who are mostly hoping to find an abasing joke or chat about violent video games safely without fear of offending someone. And that makes Discord an ideal place for far-right recruitment. Its spaces provide room for people to socialize in hate—to forge connections from which social beliefs can grow. If you hang out with Nazis and racists long enough, what begins as cruel humor can give way to a set of convictions, one that doesn't need to be approached with a layer of irony.

[26] Joseph Bernstein, *A Thriving Chat Startup Braces For The Alt-Right*, BuzzFeed NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017).
[27] April Glasser, *White Supremacists Still Have a Safe Space Online,* SLATE (Oct. 9, 2018).

112. On August 18, 2017, more than 500 white supremacists, Klansmen, neo-Nazis, and members of the alt-right participated in the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Motivated by replacement theory, the group chanted "Jews will not replace us" and carried weapons, Confederate battle flags, and Nazi and neo-Nazi symbols. In the afternoon, self-identified white supremacist James Alex Fields Jr. drove into a crowd of counter-protesters.

113. Because the Unite the Right rally promoted a message of racism and anti-Semitism, the leaders didn't do the bulk of their logistical planning in any kind of public forum or open Facebook group; instead, they used Discord.

114. Discord similarly facilitated the radicalization of Payton Gendron, the shooter that murder ten Black citizens and wounded three others at Tops Friendly Market in Buffalo, New York on May 14, 2022. *See Patterson et. al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., et. al.,* N.Y. Supreme Court, Index No. 805896/2023 (filed May 12, 2023). Gendron used Discord to keep a private journal for months where he wrote down his hateful beliefs and developed specific plans for equipping himself and perpetrating his massacre.[28] He kept a diary on a personal server and restricted it, as per available Discord settings, so that he was the only person who could view it.

115. Gendron's diary contained approximately 700 pages of original posts written by him, links to outside content, and memes.[29] He outlined details he was considering for his attack, and his Discord diary included raciest charts, graphs, and memes, which Gendron believed as proof of white genocide. Gendron's Discord logs reflect months of research he conducted on body armor, helmets, and rifles in order to "kill as many blacks as possible" and "avoid dying."[30]

116. Between August 1, 2020 and January 1, 2021, he posted at least 83 messages on the channel "#bag-general."[31]

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[28] OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL LETITIA JAMES, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE ROLES OF ONLINE PLATFORMS IN THE TRAGIC MASS SHOOTING IN BUFFALO ON MAY 14, 2022 at 3 (Oct. 18, 2022), available at https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/buffaloshooting-onlineplatformsreport.pdf (hereinafter "Attorney General Report").

[29] *Id*. at 21.

[30] Attorney General Report, *supra* note 30, at 28.

[31] Dan Feidt, *Buffalo Mass Shooter Likely Sought Combat Gear Advice on Online Chats*, UNICORN RIOT (May 14, 2022), https://unicornriot.ninja/2022/buffalo-mass-shooter-likely-sought-combat-gear-advice-on-online-chats/.

117. In theory, Discord's terms of use prohibit users under 13.

118. However, Discord does not verify user age or identity. Moreover, Discord has long been on notice that children 13 and younger use the product—and that adults preying on children do too.[32] Discord is aware, and it is commonly known and understood that nobody follows that rule, and that Discord allows children 13 and younger to use its social media product. Children as young as eight years old currently are using the Discord social media product. See Kellen Browning, 5 Ways Young People Are Using Discord, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2021.

119. Discord could enforce its supposed policy of prohibiting children 13 or younger if it wanted to do so. Among other things, minor users often state their real age in their bio and/or tell other users their real age in group and private chats using one or more Discord product features. Likewise, minor users post photos that often reflect their actual age.

120. Discord's product features also create an unreasonable opportunity for and risk of sexual exploitation of kids. By default, all product users—including users under 18—can receive friend invitations from anyone in the same server, which opens the ability for them to send and receive private messages from strangers.[33]

121. Minor users lack the cognitive ability and life experience to identify online grooming behavior by prurient adults and the psychosocial maturity to decline invitations to exchange salacious material and mass-messaging capabilities. At all times relevant, Discord allowed direct messaging with and by minors without parental notification.

122. Discord has designed and operates its product in such a way that it also allows people to chat using fake names and the task of enforcing community standards is largely delegated to the organizers of individual Discord "servers."[34] "Server" is the used to describe a key feature of the Discord product that allow users (including, as described above, underage users) to connect,

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[32] *See*, *e.g.*, Nellie Bowles and Michael Keller, *Video Games and Online Chats Are 'Hunting Grounds' for Sexual Predators*, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7. 2019, *available at* https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/07/us/video-games-child-sex-abuse.html.

[33] Samantha Murphy Kelly, The dark side of Discord for teens, CNN Business, Mar. 22, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/22/tech/discord-teens/index.html.

[34] Kellen Browning, How Discord, Born From an Obscure Game, Became a Social Hub for Young People, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2021, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/29/business/discord-server-social-media.html.

exchange photo and video files, and user Discord's audio and video communication features.

123. The Discord product generates revenue for Discord through subscription fees that gives users access to features like custom emojis for $5 or $10 per month. Discord also began experimenting in December 2021 with a new feature that allow some users to charge for access to their server, up to $100 a month, of which the company takes a 10 percent cut.[35]

124. Discord is well aware that users can and do use Discord in ways that pose risks of harm, abuse and exploitation, including using Discord to initiate and engage in explicit sexual conduct. Discord creates false assurances that users (including minor users) can turn on feature to "keep [them] safe." On information and belief, at times relevant, the Discord support page represented its "Safe Direct Messaging" feature as follows:

> Keep me safe: The safest option. This will have Discord scan any image sent in all DMs, regardless of whether you've added the user on your friend list, or the user is DMing you just by sharing a mutual server.
>
> My friends are nice: The medium-est option! This will let Discord know to scan any images sent in DMs from users that aren't on your friends list, but also to trust your previously-added friends and not worry about any images they send.
>
> Do not scan: The self-confident option. Enabling this option will completely disable Discord's image scanning process, and leave you for a walk on the wild side for any and all DMs you receive. Careful, it's a jungle out there![36]

The representations that Discord will "scan" images and provide "Safe Messaging!" reasonably would lead minor users to believe that Discord will scan for and block sexually explicit materials, including materials used to groom and/or blackmail users, and otherwise "keep [the user] safe."

125. As a threshold matter, Discord's direct messaging and "Safe Direct Messaging" product features are inherently defective and/or dangerous for minor users because Discord should not be presenting less-safe product options ("My friends are nice" and "Do not scan") to users under 18 without their parents' knowledge and consent.

126. Moreover, Discord downplays the serious dangers its product presents to minor users

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[35] Kellen Browning, How Discord, Born From an Obscure Game, Became a Social Hub for Young People, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2021, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/29/business/discord-server-social-media.html.

[36] Discord Safety: Safe Messaging!, https://support.discord.com/hc/en-us/articles/1150000068672-Discord-Safety-Safe-Messaging-

by "jokingly" referring to unsolicited sexual overtures, grooming, displays of explicit sexual materials, abuse, exploitation, and blackmail as "the wild side" and "a jungle." Presenting these less-safe options to minors and without verification of parental consent (for minor users) is a product defect and/or inherently dangerous because Discord is attempting to contract with minors without warning to minor parents and in a manner that poses significant risk to a significant number of its minor users.

127. Discord's Safe Direct Messaging product also is defective and/or does not operate as promised and as reasonably understood by Discord's minor users. This product does not operate as promised and as reasonably understood by Discord's minor users and creates a false sense of safety that results in direct harm to a significant number of Discord's minor users.

128. A reasonable person reviewing Discord's description of its "Safe Direct Messaging" feature reasonably would understand that Discord was representing it would keep them "safe" from harmful interactions and predatory users, including by monitoring and saving conversations had via Discord's social media product and as long as the user selects the "Keep me safe" option. Discord's product feature does nothing of the sort, however. On information and belief, at best, Discord scans image files for malware and similar issues. As such, users (especially minor users) are lulled into a false and dangerous sense of security while using the product.

129. Discord's platform is defective as its "Safe Direct Messaging" feature does not actually keep minor Discord users safe and is deceptive and misleading and inherently dangerous for minor Discord users because it creates a false sense of security and encourages them to use the Discord product under the false belief that it is safe for children.

130. Discord's platform also is defective and unreasonably unsafe for minor users because it has no effective parental controls. Children are able to and do routinely use Discord despite being 13 or younger and despite having no parental consent to use the product, let alone to be placed at risk of trauma, abuse, and exploitation through use of the product exactly in the manner and for the purpose for which Discord designed the product.

131. Discord's platform also is defective for failure to provide any effective warnings to minor users, let alone their guardians, of the known risk of harm from the abuse and sexual

exploitation when children use the product.

132. Discord's platform also is defective for failure to provide guardians with any means to effectively report or otherwise stop Discord from providing their minor children with access to its platform.

G. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TO ROBLOX

133. Roblox owns, promotes, distributes and operates Roblox. Roblox was launched in 2006 and is a product described by Roblox as "a human co-experience platform."

134. The Roblox product includes multiple features designed to result in dependency, for example, compulsion loops, endless gameplay, reward systems, and in-game purchases. Roblox uses elements like variable reward systems and microtransactions to reinforce addictive behavior patterns, similar to gambling except that Roblox utilizes these features on vulnerable children

135. The Roblox product also includes features that allow users to "interact with each other to explore and develop immersive, user generated, 3D experiences", including "experiences" that take the form of games created by users (anything from a simulation of running a virtual restaurant to adopting a pet).

136. The Roblox product is marketed to and designed to appeal to children, primarily children under the age of 13. For example, the overall look and feel of Roblox—described as "roughly hewn, blocky aesthetics and ugly text"—is "off-putting to adults." [37] But the style of Roblox and its "game" features are appealing to young children. Indeed, "children loved the fact Roblox offered access to an endless stream of new and free experiences—a kind of YouTube for video games."[38]

137. Roblox is one of the most popular online products among American teens and children. "A December 2017 study by Comscore reported that kids between the ages of 5 and 9

[37] Simon Parkin, *The trouble with Roblox, the video game empire built on child labour*, The Guardian, Jan. 9, 2022, *available at* https://www.theguardian.com/games/2022/jan/09/the-trouble-with-roblox-the-video-game-empire-built-on-child-labour ("Roblox was built as a playful method of teaching children the rudiments of game-making").

[38] Simon Parkin, *The trouble with Roblox, the video game empire built on child labour*, The Guardian, Jan. 9, 2022, *available at* https://www.theguardian.com/games/2022/jan/09/the-trouble-with-roblox-the-video-game-empire-built-on-child-labour ("Roblox was built as a playful method of teaching children the rudiments of game-making").

spend more time using the Roblox product than doing anything else online on PCs. For those between the ages of 9 and 18, only YouTube consumes more of their online attention.[39] As of 2020, about 75% of American children ages 9 through 12" regularly uses Roblox, according to the company.[40] During the pandemic, kids' use of Roblox escalated. Indeed, by July 2020, users spent 3 billion hours on Roblox, twice as much time as in February 2020." [41]

138. Roblox also marketed its product as educational and encouraged integration of its product into several kid-focused organizations and activities. For example, "Schools, camps, Girl Scout troops and many other organizations use Roblox to teach kids coding. And it has become a quasi-social-network for children."[42]

139. Roblox generates the bulk of its revenue by selling its users in-game currency, called "Robux," which users can then spend on virtual items for their avatars. [43] Roblox reports that only a small portion of users purchase Robux. On information and belief, at least some number of such users are adults who use Robux to entice and exploit child users.

140. Because Robux sales are key to the product's revenue, Roblox was disincentivized to alter the product design and operation to prevent dangerous, exploitative and injurious adult-child interactions using the Roblox product. Indeed, Roblox reported in its recent Form 10-Q that it relies on developers to develop product offerings that encourage use of the Robux feature.[44]

141. For example, Roblox represents that it uses advanced technologies to, "identify problematic language, potential bypasses to our chat filters, and content that falls outside our policies" and "review and monitor communications that flow through Roblox to block and protect

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[39] *See, e.g.*, Burt Helm, *Sex, lies, and video games: Inside Roblox's war on porn*, Fast Company, Aug. 19, 2020, *available at* https://www.fastcompany.com/90539906/sex-lies-and-video-games-inside-roblox-war-on-porn; https://www.businessofapps.com/data/roblox-statistics/ ("Roblox highest demographic is children under 13 and it was the most popular entertainment app for that age group").

[40] Shannon Liao, *How Roblox became the 'it' game for tweens—and a massive business*, CNN Business, Oct. 29, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/tech/roblox-explainer/index.html

[41] Shannon Liao, *How Roblox became the 'it' game for tweens—and a massive business*, CNN Business, Oct. 29, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/tech/roblox-explainer/index.html

[42] *Id*.

[43] *See* Roblox Corporation, Form 10-Q, March 31, 2022, *available at* https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001315098/ea0f0408-7ea4-48f8-a127-fef1fdb69aa3.pdf, at 59.

[44] *See* Roblox Corporation, Form 10-Q, March 31, 2022, *available at* https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001315098/ea0f0408-7ea4-48f8-a127-fef1fdb69aa3.pdf, at 15.

users from inappropriate behavior, such as questions about personal information and instructions on how to connect on less protective third-party chat applications."[45]

142. Roblox also represents that the "The algorithms in our chat filters are age-sensitive: they monitor both what users can say and see based on their ages."[46]

143. Roblox CEO and Co-Founder, David Baszucki has made public assurances that safety allegedly lies at the core of everything the company has built. It was, he said, "what everything rests on," and he who monitor use of the product and manually check anything activity flagged as inappropriate and escalate incidents of suspected grooming.[47]

144. Baszucki also has touted Roblox's "stringent safety system," calling it "one of the most rigorous of any platform, going well beyond regulatory requirements."[48]

145. Notably, however, Roblox's director of community safety and digital civility is reported as having stated that "You can't retrofit safety," indicating that Roblox was aware of the dangers of its product and the harm it already had caused.[49]

146. Roblox also touts the fact that it employs hundreds of "moderators" globally to actively review and address harmful and/or inappropriate content, for the specific purpose of keeping its underage users safe. For example, in 2020. Roblox reported that it has "a team of 1,600 moderators who monitor the platform for inappropriate content and conduct safety reviews of all images, audio and video files using humans and machine scanning."[50] Likewise, in November 2021, Roblox CEO and Co-Founder, David Baszucki, represented that Roblox employs more than 2,000 moderators around the world.[51]

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[45] *See* Roblox Corporation, Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2022, *available at* *https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1315098/000131509823000035/rblx-20221231.htm*, at 59.

[46] Roblox Corporation 2021 Annual Report and 2022 Proxy Statement, May 26, 2022, *available at* https://s27.q4cdn.com/984876518/files/doc_financials/2021/ar/Roblox_Proxy-and-Annual-Report_Web-Ready_Bookmarked-(1).pdf , at 16 (pdf page 83).

[47] Simon Parkin, *The trouble with Roblox, the video game empire built on child labour*, The Guardian, Jan. 9, 2022, *available at* https://www.theguardian.com/games/2022/jan/09/the-trouble-with-roblox-the-video-game-empire-built-on-child-labour

[48] *Id.*

[49] *Id*.

[50] Shannon Liao, *How Roblox became the 'it' game for tweens—and a massive business*, CNN Business, Oct. 29, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/tech/roblox-explainer/index.html.

[51] Simon Parkin, *The trouble with Roblox, the video game empire built on child labour*, The Guardian, Jan. 9, 2022,

147. On information and belief, Roblox knew or should have known of certain defects and/or inherently dangerous features in its Roblox product, which Roblox designed, promoted, operated, and distributed to the mass, public market (targeting children), and which Roblox could have designed, distributed, promoted and operated safely and in a responsible manner with a reasonable investment of time and capital. Roblox chose not to use safer designs and policies and chose not to provide robust, accurate warnings about the dangers its product posed to child users. On information and belief, Roblox made those choices, at least in part, because it believed such changes might curb the explosive growth in use of the product (by number of users, amount of time users spent with the product, and level of engagement with the product) and also might curb revenues generated for Roblox by the Roblox product.

148. At all times relevant, while Roblox was designed for, promoted for and to, and distributed to children, Roblox also designed product features that provided adults with unfettered and obviously dangerous access to children, such as the Roblox direct and/or instant messaging ("direct messaging") feature, as well as features that allow children to receive Robux currency from complete strangers. At all times relevant, Roblox failed to take reasonable steps to protect the children it targeted as its main product users and also failed to adequately warn parents and children of the dangers of these product features.

149. In other words, in a product designed for, targeted at, and promoted as safe for children, Roblox created and deployed product features that literally allow adult strangers to talk to and connect with kids and offer them (virtual) money. And Roblox did so in the face of the known risk—and known actual occurrence—of adults using the Roblox product to find and then exploit child users—while those adult users also paid Roblox for Robux.[52]

150. Minor users lack the cognitive ability and life experience to identify online grooming

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available at https://www.theguardian.com/games/2022/jan/09/the-trouble-with-roblox-the-video-game-empire-built-on-child-labour.

[52] *See, e.g.,* "*Roblox: 'I thought he was playing an innocent game,'*" BBC, May 30, 2019, *available at* https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48450604; "*The hidden dangers in Roblox*," KIDAS, May 26, 2021, *available at* https://getkidas.com/the-hidden-dangers-in-roblox/; *The trouble with Roblox, the video game empire built on child labour*, The Guardian, Jan. 9, 2022, *available at* https://www.theguardian.com/games/2022/jan/09/the-trouble-with-roblox-the-video-game-empire-built-on-child-labour (former Roblox moderator discussing grooming and harassment that occurred to her by adults she met on Roblox as a child).

behavior by prurient adults and the psychosocial maturity to decline invitations to exchange salacious material and mass-messaging capabilities. At all times relevant, Roblox allowed direct messaging with and by minors without parental notification.

151. At all times relevant, Roblox could have taken reasonable steps (with relatively nominal investment of expense and time) to better protect their child users, for example, (a) not allowing use of its direct messaging product between minor users and adult users (including employing robust age verification mechanisms and/or preventing minor users from direct messaging any users without verifiable parental consent), (b) not allowing adult users to initiate messaging with minors or to message with minors at all, unless such contact is approved by the minor user's parent, (c) by warning parents of the direct messaging product feature and of Roblox's failures to create the safe environment it promised, (d) notifying parents every time their minor child engaged in direct messaging with another user (particularly an adult user), and/or by providing a transcript of all direct message to parents, (e) verifying age and identity (as well as parental approval) in order to block access to child users by adult users unknown to them in real life, and (f) requiring identification and contact information, as well as an exchange of emails, between users and minor user parents before any contact is allowed.

152. Direct messaging and "Robux" features are not necessary to operation of the Roblox product, nor to creation of a reasonably safe, "social" platform appropriate for children.

II. PLAINTIFF SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. LilLee JoyceAnn Harken Wilkins (December 17, 2010 – September 1, 2024)



153. Plaintiff Sarah Harken, individually and as successor-in-interest to LilLee Wilkins, asserts claims against the Meta, Snap, TikTok, and Google Defendants in connection with Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube.

154. LilLee lived in Littleton, Colorado.

155. Her family was low income and her mom worked hard to provide for her children, and to give them the best life possible.

156. LilLee was active in her close-knit church community, loved God, and was filled with faith and joy. She loved choir and sang the national anthem with her choir class at a Colorado Rockies game in 2024. She was active at her church and youth-related events, and she actively



participated in and contributed to the mission of the Salvation Army. She volunteered at Salvation Army food trucks and participated at events during holidays. Any time her church or the Salvation Army had events, she wanted and would ask to participate. In fact, in July 2024, LilLee told her mom that she wanted to speak out on the issue of families needing help with school supplies. She appeared on the local news so that others would understand the importance of helping families in need.

157. Sarah worried that LilLee might be treated differently because she was low income. That is part of why she was okay with LilLee using Defendants' products. She had seen the advertisements after COVID started and touting how fun and safe these platforms were. She already had to worry about how she was going to be able to afford clothes that did not make LilLee stand out and school supplies. LilLee also had a speech issue and learning disability that required an IEP, and that Sarah worried made her feel different from those around her at school. So when all the kids were making dance videos on TikTok and Snapchatting with their friends, when LilLee was really good at dancing, and these companies swore that their products were safe for kids, Sarah felt relieved that there was something LilLee could do to connect with other kids and fit in, without regard to how much money her family had.

158. LilLee began using these platforms in or around late 2020 or early 2021, when she was 10 years old, and such use coincided with a decline in her mental health.

159. It was subtle at first. LilLee began falling sleep with the phone in her hand. At first, Sarah thought it was cute. She didn't realize that this was a sign of addiction, including because Defendants said that their products were safe and did not disclose the risk of addiction. She thought this was a sign that LilLee was making new friends and being more social. But then LilLee began to struggle, so Sarah told her that she needed quiet time before bed – that she needed to read a book or find some other activity.

160. LilLee began to have trouble sleeping for the first time in her life.

161. Sarah's quiet time rule seemed like it might work at first, and including because LilLee had never had issues following rules. Sarah had no reason to think she would struggle this time either, but she did. She kept getting back onto her device every chance she got.

162. Sarah tried monitoring and enforcing it, but it became a full-time job. LilLee's friends would call and LilLee would say that they needed to do homework, which was true much of the time. But unless her mother stood over her shoulder the entire time, there was no way enforce quiet time rules or stop her from accessing Defendants' platforms.

163. LilLee also had a Chrome Book from school that the school allowed students to take home. Sarah checked on the device and understood that the school was using some sort of software to prevent kids from getting onto YouTube and other forms of social media; but then she heard LilLee and her friends talking about how they were able to get around those protections.

164. When Sarah overheard this conversation, she had a talk with LilLee and told her to not bypass the protections the school had in place. She explained that she could get into trouble for this and that school was supposed to be focused on learning. LilLee seemed to listen, but it was only after her death that Sarah realized there was no way to enforce these kinds of rules – that Defendants design and distribute their products in a manner intended to get around parental knowledge and consent. In fact, after LilLee's death, Sarah even saw that LilLee had posted videos to YouTube that she took *while she was in class*. Defendants provide no means or mechanisms for parents to know what they are doing with underage children via their platforms, and actively encourage use of their products in classrooms, when children are supposed to be learning instead.

165. Sarah also learned, after LilLee's death, that the TikTok Defendant allowed LilLee to open multiple accounts. Sarah would occasionally check LilLee's phone and the apps installed on that device, to make sure strangers were not trying to contact her daughter and to otherwise safeguard against the kinds of harms she believed to exist. What she did not know and had no reason to suspect, was that TikTok had allowed LilLee to open multiple accounts and that the one Sarah did not know about was the one Sarah needed to see the most – the one where, on information and belief, TikTok pushed LilLee into a filter bubble of suicide and self-harm and where LilLee then posted explicit videos talking about how she planned to kill herself in the days leading up to her death. Not just suggesting that she might try but explicitly stating that she had tried and was trying. Yet Sarah knew nothing about this account, because TikTok designed it that way.

166. Sarah also did not know and had no reason to suspect that Defendants were addicting and exploiting LilLee by design. LilLee went from a happy and self-confident child to one who felt "ugly" because of the advertisements Defendants pushed to her by design. Not content, but paid advertisements pushing beauty products and diet ads and similar.

167. Chapter 44 of Careless People, written by former Meta employee and now whistleblower, Sarah Wynn Williams, describes how Meta designed an algorithm to determine when users were happy and sad; how it went to advertisers for these kinds of products and told them that it could determine when a teen girl was at her lowest, and that it would then hit her with their diet and makeup ads to exploit that vulnerability. On information and belief, Meta was not the only company that engaged in such predatory practices. Instead, they all profiled and targeted LilLee in this manner, and she began to suffer serious harms and died as a result.

168. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, LilLee developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began including, eventually, death.

169. Defendants targeted LilLee with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features. They sent her notifications non-stop, made friend recommendations and convinced LilLee that she needed to keep using and checking their products non-stop. They pushed social comparison features that distorted her sense of self and, even when LilLee tried to take breaks, Defendants refused to let her. Google, for example, would send notifications telling her that she hadn't posted in a while and convincing her to get back onto YouTube. The Defendants also would tell her things like how many people reacted to a post. For example, if LilLee expected a lot of reactions, Defendants might flag that only 10 people reacted to her video and would tell her she should repost to get more views. So that's what LilLee would do. These Defendants knew that she was a child, and instead of erring on the side of safety, they exploited and manipulated that vulnerability for their own benefit.

170. These are harms LilLee did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms LilLee became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

171. On Thursday, August 29, 2024, LilLee wasn't feeling well, so her mother called her out sick from school. She was having cramps and complained of a stomachache.

172. LilLee still had stomach cramps on Friday and Saturday. She said they were still bothering her on Sunday, September 1, 2024, so Sarah allowed her to stay home while the rest of her family went to church.

173. On September 1, 2024, while everyone was at church, LilLee died by suicide as the result of the harms Defendants' caused by design. Her family found her when they got home.

174. What Sarah only found out later was that some of LilLee's classmates saw troubling posts she put up on her secret TikTok account – the one TikTok allowed her to open without parental knowledge or consent – and tried to warn the school that LilLee was at risk.

175. Sarah did not know and was not told, and LilLee died. She was only 13 years old.

176. LilLee and her family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to LilLee and those who love her.

B. Zen Marchand-Hill (February 16, 2009 – September 6, 2024)



177. Plaintiff Charles Hill, individually and as successor-in-interest to Zen Marchand-Hill, asserts claims against the Discord Defendant in connection with Discord.

178. Zen lived in Wyoming and North Carolina and was 15 years old when she died.

179. Zen was around 12 years old when she started using Discord. She also enjoyed playing Minecraft, and Discord was advertised as and believed to be an app used by gamers to enhance their gaming experience. Zen, however, did not have her parents' permission to use Discord. She began using it without their knowledge or consent, while Discord designed in a manner intended to allow such underage use.

180. Zen's use of Discord coincided with a decline in her mental health.

181. Zen's use of Discord started on her desktop and then, later, on the cellphone. She started using Discord every chance she could, often spending ten or more hours a day on the platform. Her parents tried installing the Bark app, but Zen found ways around it.

182. On information and belief, Discord targeted Zen with push notifications at all times of day designed to and that did pull her back onto the platform even when she tried to stop using it, and other addictive features. She began to have trouble sleeping, which resulting sleep deprivation foreseeable and severely impacted her mental health.

183. As the foreseeable result of Discord's extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Zen developed harmful dependencies on this platform, resulting in sleep deprivation, exploitation, suicidal ideation, other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began and, ultimately, death by suicide.

184. These are harms Zen did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Discord created, however, they were harms Zen became unable to avoid, as Discord reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating its platform.

185. Zen died on September 6, 2024. Her phone was lying next to her in a manner suggesting that she had been holding it when she died.

186. Zen and her family did not know or have reason to know about Discord's defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Discord was using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Discord's knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Zen and those who love her.

C. <u>Sofie Igunbor (June 5, 2006 – April 28, 2023)</u>



187. Plaintiff Joseph Igunbor, individually and as successor-in-interest to Sofie Igunbor, asserts claims against the TikTok, Roblox, and Discord Defendants in connection with TikTok, Roblox, and Discord.

188. Sofie lived in Morton Grove, Illinois. She was only 16 when she died.

189. Sofie's mother passed away when she was three years old, but her father and sisters were always there. They are a close and engaged family, and Sofie was their jokester. She would act silly to make those around her laugh, and those around her often did. She was funny, and kind. She played tennis and was happiest when she could swim in the ocean.

190. Sofie began using Roblox in or around 2018, when she was 12. Her dad understood that Roblox was a fun and safe app for kids, aimed at kids under the age of 10. He reasonably relied on Roblox's marketing and had no reason to suspect that the Roblox product was addictive or dangerous, and that Roblox was providing predators with tools to connect with kids.

191. She began using Discord and TikTok around the same time, however, she did so without her father's knowledge or consent. On information and belief, both of these Defendants knew or had reason to know that Sofie was underage and lacked parental consent and provided to her anyway. They also knew that they were designing their products to addict and exploit vulnerable, young users like and including Sofie, and continued to market to and make money off of those young users anyway.

192. Sofie's use of these products coincided with a decline in her mental health. She quickly became addicted to all three and would spend as much time as humanly possible on them. She began to have trouble sleeping and, overtime, suffered foreseeable and related harms like anxiety and depression. Sofie began to withdraw from the world around her, and her smile began to fade – while her father had no reason or way to understand that the source of harm was the very same product he believed to be safe for children and two others who had obtained entry into his home under the cover of dark. Defendants design and distribute their products with this in mind – making sure they can get into as many homes and classrooms as possible, no matter the resulting harm to young users.

193. Sofie's father put a basket in the hallway, where the kids were required to put their phones at night. What Joseph only realized recently was that these Defendants engineer addiction to the point where some young users cannot look away and feel as though they cannot live without these products. What he only learned recently was that these Defendants made sure that Sofie could not sleep, and she would sneak up to regain access in the middle of the night as a result.

194. TikTok profiled and targeted Sofie with massive amounts of social comparison advertisements, which eroded her sense of self. It also targeted her with things like sadness and self-harm – again, by design. It prioritizes its own profit over the lives of children.

195. Roblox similarly failed to warn and created a dangerous product, which it then handed out to kids for free; along with Discord. Roblox connected Sofie to predators, and Discord provided them a place to abuse her without consequence. While Sofie's addictions to these platforms made it impossible for her to stop.

196. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Sofie developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, self-harm in the form of cutting exploitation, suicidal ideation, other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began, and, eventually, death.

197. Defendants targeted Sofie with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

198. These are harms Sofie did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms Sofie became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

199. Sofie died by suicide on April 28, 2023, as the result of the physical and mental harms these Defendants caused her by design. Her death destroyed her family and almost resulted in her father's death – he has since sought medical help and is doing what he can to survive.

200. But Defendants know that these are the harms they cause. They know that they are harming children, and they know that when you harm a child, you harm everyone who loves them.

201. Sofie and her family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Sofie and those who love her.

D. G.M.

202. Plaintiff C.C., on behalf of G.M. asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, Snap, and Google Defendants in connection with Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and YouTube.

203. G.M. lives in Wayne County, New York.

204. G.M. is believed to have started using Facebook first, in or around 2019 at age 6, and then Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and YouTube later, in or around 2023 at age 10. Such use coincided with a decline in his mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, G.M. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, self-harm in the form of cutting, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

205. Defendants targeted G.M. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

206. These are harms G.M. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms G.M. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

207. G.M. and his family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to G.M.

E. S.B.

208. Plaintiff P.H., on behalf of S.B., asserts claims against the Snap Defendant in connection with Snapchat.

209. S.B. lives in Angelina County, Texas.

210. She began using Snapchat in our around 2022, when she was 9 or 10 years old, and without her parents' knowledge or consent. Snap distributed its product to her regardless and never sought or obtained parental consent.

211. S.B.'s use of Snapchat coincided with a decline in her mental health.

212. As the foreseeable result of Snap's extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, S.B. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, self-harm in the form of cutting, exploitation, suicidal ideation, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

213. S.B. began to have trouble sleeping and struggled with other social media addiction related harms. Shortly after her Snapchat use began, Snap also used her personal data points, including on information and belief her age, gender, and location, to affirmatively connect her with adult predators on its platform. On information and belief, one or more of these predators would have been reported and/or known to Snap both as an adult and as someone engaged in predatory conduct in its digital place of business. Snap encouraged and made such connections anyway and further made these connections and convinced S.B. to accept via its material contributions in the form of Bitmoji avatars, by representing to S.B. that these adult strangers were her "Friends," and further, be gamifying and rewarding her for connecting with them.

214. Snap knew this was dangerous, but made it look and seem safe to S.B., and S.B. suffered exploitation related harms – in addition to social media addiction and related mental health harms – as a result of Snap's own representations and actions.

215. Snap targeted S.B. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

216. These are harms S.B. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms S.B. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

217. S.B. and her family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to S.B.

F. N.H.

218. Plaintiff D.H., on behalf of N.H. asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, Snap, and Google Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and YouTube.

219. N.H. lives in Lenawee County, Michigan.

220. N.H. is believed to have started using YouTube first, in or around 2020 at age 9, then Instagram and Snapchat in or around 2024 at age 13, and finally TikTok in or around 2025 at age 14. Such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, N.H. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, self-harm in the form of cutting, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

221. Defendants targeted N.H. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

222. These are harms N.H. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms N.H. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

223. N.H. and her family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants'

knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to N.H.

G. M.W.

224. Plaintiff C.C., on behalf of M.W. asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, and Google Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube.

225. M.W. lives in Cook County, Illinois.

226. M.W. is believed to have started using YouTube first in or around 2017, at age 6, and then TikTok and Instagram later, in or around 2024 at age 13. Such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, M.W. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, bulimia, binge eating disorder, self-harm in the form of cutting, exploitation, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

227. Defendants targeted M.W. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

228. These are harms M.W. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms M.W. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

229. M.W. and her family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to M.W.

H. M.D.

230. Plaintiff S.D., on behalf of M.D. asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, and Snap Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat.

231. M.D. lives in Jefferson County, Alabama.

232. M.D. is believed to have started using TikTok first, in or around 2018 at age 9, and then Instagram and Snapchat later, in or around 2021 at age 12. Such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, M.D. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, anorexia, bulimia, body dysmorphia, self-harm in the form of cutting, exploitation, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

233. Defendants targeted M.D. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

234. These are harms M.D. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms M.D. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

235. M.D. and her family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to M.D.

I. L.K.

236. Plaintiff C.K., on behalf of L.K. asserts claims against the Meta and TikTok Defendants in connection with Instagram and TikTok.

237. L.K. lives in Cook County, Illinois.

238. L.K. is believed to have started using TikTok first, in or around 2020 at age 11, and then Instagram in or around 2023 at age 14. Such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, L.K. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, bulimia, self-harm in the form of cutting, exploitation,

suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

239. Defendants targeted L.K. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

240. These are harms L.K. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms L.K. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

241. L.K. and her family did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to L.K.

J. Devin Misicka

242. Plaintiff Devin Misicka asserts claims against the Google Defendant in connection with YouTube.

243. Devin lives in Los Angeles County, California.

244. Devin started using YouTube in or around 2016, at age 9 and such use coincided with a decline in his mental health. As the foreseeable result of Google's extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Devin developed harmful dependencies on YouTube, resulting in sleep deprivation, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

245. Google targeted Devin with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven feed-based tools and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

246. These are harms Devin did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Google created, however, they were harms Devin. became unable to avoid, as Google reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating YouTube.

247. Devin did not know or have reason to know about Google's defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that the Google Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Devin.

K. Olivia Parsons

248. Plaintiff Olivia Parsons asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, Snap, and Google Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and YouTube.

249. Olivia lives in Hillsborough County, Florida.

250. Olivia started using these platforms in or around 2018, at age 12, and such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Olivia developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, self-harm in the form of punching and hitting herself, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

251. Defendants targeted Olivia with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

252. These are harms Olivia did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms Olivia became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

253. Olivia did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Olivia.

L. I.F.

254. Plaintiff I.F. asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, Snap, and Google Defendants in connection with Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and YouTube.

255. I.F. lives in Catawba County, North Carolina.

256. I.F. started using these platforms in or around 2019, at age 12, and such use coincided with a decline in his mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, I.F. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, anorexia, body dysmorphia, self-harm in the form of cutting, exploitation, suicidal ideation, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

257. Defendants targeted I.F. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

258. These are harms I.F. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms I.F. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

259. I.F. did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to I.F.

M. Wesley Konnerup

260. Plaintiff Wesley Konnerup asserts claims against the Google Defendant in connection with YouTube.

261. Wesley lives in Island County, Washington.

262. Wesley started using YouTube in or around 2014, at age 8 and such use coincided with a decline in his mental health. As the foreseeable result of Google's extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Wesley developed harmful

dependencies on YouTube, resulting in sleep deprivation, anxiety, depression, self-harm in the form of cutting and poking, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

263. Google targeted Wesley with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven feed-based tools and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

264. These are harms Wesley did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Google created, however, they were harms Wesley. became unable to avoid, as Google reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating YouTube.

265. Wesley did not know or have reason to know about Google's defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that the Google Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Wesley.

N. Tristan Russell

266. Plaintiff Tristan Russell asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok and Snap Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat.

267. Tristan lives in Arapahoe County, Colorado.

268. Tristan started using these platforms in or around 2016, at age 10, and such use coincided with a decline in his mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Tristan developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, self-harm in the form of cutting, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

269. Defendants targeted Tristan with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

270. These are harms Tristan did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms Tristan became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

271. Tristan did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Tristan.

O. Grant Smith

272. Plaintiff Grant Smith asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, Snap, and Google Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and YouTube.

273. Grant lives in San Diego County, California.

274. Grant started using YouTube first, in or around 2017 at age 11, then Instagram in or around 2019 at age 13, and finally Snapchat and TikTok in or around 2020 at age 14. Such use coincided with a decline in his mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Grant developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, self-harm in the form of cutting, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

275. Defendants targeted Grant with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

276. These are harms Grant did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms Grant became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

277. Grant did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and

deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Grant.

P. E.W.

278. Plaintiff E.W. asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, Snap, and Google Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and YouTube.

279. E.W. lives in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.

280. E.W. started using YouTube first in or around 2013, at age 8 and then Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok later, in or around 2018 at age 13. Such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, E.W. developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, anorexia, body dysmorphia, self-harm in the form of cutting, exploitation, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

281. Defendants targeted E.W. with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

282. These are harms E.W. did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms E.W. became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

283. E.W. did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to E.W.

Q. Mia Perez

284. Plaintiff Mia Perez asserts claims against the Meta, TikTok, and Snap Defendants in connection with Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat.

285. Mia lives in Los Angeles County, California.

286. Mia started using Instagram and Snapchat first, in or around 2017 at age 12, and then TikTok later, in or around 2023 at age 18. Such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Mia developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, body dysmorphia, self-harm in the form of cutting, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

287. Defendants targeted Mia with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

288. These are harms Mia did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms Mia became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

289. Mia did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Mia.

R. Nia Colquitt

290. Plaintiff Nia Colquitt asserts claims against the Meta, Snap, and Google Defendants in connection with Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and YouTube.

291. Nia lives in Cook County, Illinois.

292. Nia started using Facebook and YouTube in or around 2011, at age 9 and then Instagram and Snapchat later, in or around 2014 at age 12. Such use coincided with a decline in her mental health. As the foreseeable result of Defendants' extended use designs and other defective and/or inherently harmful designs and actions, Nia developed harmful dependencies on these platforms, resulting in sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety, body dysmorphia, self-harm in the

form of cutting, scratching, and head banging, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and other serious mental health harms not experienced prior to when such use began.

293. Defendants targeted Nia with Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven user recommendation tools, AI driven feed-based tools, and harmful social comparison and social rewards tools and features.

294. These are harms Nia did not seek out or want. Due to the dependencies Defendants created, however, they were harms Nia became unable to avoid, as Defendants reasonably foresaw and intended when designing, programming, and operating their platforms.

295. Nia did not know or have reason to know about Defendants' defective and/or inherently dangerous products, features, and/or tools, or that Defendants were using such products, features, and/or tools in an exploitative and harmful manner. While Defendants' knowing and deliberate product design, marketing, distribution, programming and operational decisions and conduct caused serious emotional, mental, and physical harms to Nia.

III. TIMELINESS AND TOLLING OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

296. Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, Plaintiffs did not and could not have discovered that Defendants' products caused their injuries and/or sequelae thereto because, at the time of these injuries and/or sequelae thereto, the cause was unknown to Plaintiffs.

297. Plaintiffs did not suspect and had no reason to suspect Defendants' products caused their injuries and/or sequelae thereto until less than the applicable limitations period prior to the filing of this action.

298. Due to the highly technical nature of the platforms' features, Plaintiffs and were unable to independently discover that Defendants' products caused their injuries and/or sequelae thereto until less than the applicable limitations period prior to the filing of this action.

299. Defendants had exclusive knowledge of the material defects designed and implemented into their platforms, and they have at all times through the present maintained their proprietary designs of their platforms' features as strictly confidential.

300. In addition, Defendants' fraudulent concealment and/or other tortious conduct tolled the running of any statute of limitations.

301. Defendants had a duty to disclose dangerous and defective features that cause foreseeable harm to children and teens.

302. Defendants knowingly, affirmatively, and actively concealed from Plaintiffs the risks associated with the defects of Defendants' products and that these products caused their injuries and/or sequelae thereto.

303. Defendants committed tortious and/or fraudulent acts that continue to this day. As of the date of this Complaint, Defendants still have not disclosed, and continue to conceal, that they designed and implemented dangerous features into their platforms. Despite their knowledge of the defects and their attendant safety risks, Defendants continue to market their platforms to children and teens while simultaneously omitting the disclosure of known and foreseeable harms to children and teens. In contrast, Plaintiffs were unaware and could not have reasonably known or learned through reasonable diligence that they had been exposed to the defects and risks alleged herein and that those defects and risks were the direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions.

304. Plaintiffs were unaware and could not have reasonably known or learned through reasonable diligence that the harms they suffered were directly and proximately caused by Defendants' acts and omissions.

305. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants are estopped from relying on any statutes of limitation or repose as a defense in this action and as to all claims against them. All applicable statutes of limitation and repose have been tolled by operation of one of more of the following: the discovery rule, Defendants' active and fraudulent concealment, equitable tolling, and/or the continuing nature of harms Defendants' caused and continue causing to this day.

IV. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS

306. The entirety of this Complaint is pled upon information and belief and each allegation contained herein is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

307. Plaintiffs plead all Causes of Action of this Complaint in the broadest sense, pursuant to all laws that may apply under choice-of-law principles, including the law of the resident states of Plaintiffs. To the extent applicable to specific Causes of Action, Plaintiffs plead these Causes of

Action under all applicable product liability acts, statutes, and laws of their respective States.

308. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and adopt as though set forth in full herein, the following causes of action and allegations from Section VI of the Master Complaint:

COUNT 1:
STRICT LIABILITY – DESIGN DEFECT
(Against All Defendants)

309. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein, and hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 825 through 850 of the Master Complaint.

COUNT 2:
STRICT LIABILITY – FAILURE TO WARN
(Against All Defendants)

310. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein, and hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 852 through 868 of the Master Complaint.

COUNT 3:
NEGLIGENCE – DESIGN
(Against All Defendants)

311. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein, and hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 870 through 892 of the Master Complaint.

COUNT 4:
NEGLIGENCE – FAILURE TO WARN
(Against All Defendants)

312. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein, and hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 894 through 911 of the Master Complaint.

COUNT 5:
NEGLIGENCE
(Against All Defendants)

313. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein, and hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 913 through 938 of the Master Complaint.

COUNT 6:
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
(Against the Meta Defendant)

314. Plaintiffs Sarah Harken, individually and as successor-in-interest to LilLee Wilkins, Deceased, C.C. and G.M., D.H. and N.H., S.D. and M.D., C.K. and L.K., Olivia Parsons, I.F., Tristan Russell, Grant Smith, E.W., Mia Perez, and Nia Colquitt reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein.

315. This claim is brought against Meta.

316. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 958 through 976 of the Master Complaint.

317. These minor Plaintiffs asked their parent or parents if they could open Instagram and/or Facebook accounts or opened those accounts without their parents' knowledge or consent, which accounts their parents then found out about. Prior to those children joining Instagram and/or Facebook and/or discovery of those accounts, their parents were generally familiar with those products and were unaware that youth usage of those products could lead to addiction and other mental and physical health harms.

318. Relying on the information Meta provided and put out into the public, Plaintiffs believed that Instagram and/or Facebook were safe and age-appropriate for the aforementioned minor Plaintiffs. These Plaintiffs did not see nor were they aware of any information about the defective features identified herein and in the Master Complaint. Nor did they see any information about the risks of addiction or resulting physical and mental health harms from usage of Instagram and/or Facebook. These omissions were material to their decision to allow their minor children to open an account on Instagram and/or Facebook.

319. Had Meta publicly or privately disclosed the risks of harm associated with its products' defects, these Plaintiffs would have been aware of such disclosures and would not have allowed their minor children to open an account or continue using an account once discovered; and likewise, the children themselves would have been aware of such disclosures and would not have opened an account.

COUNT: 7
NEGLIGENCE PER SE
(Against All Defendants)

320. Plaintiffs Charles Hill, individually and as successor-in-interest to Zen Marchand-Hill, deceased (as against the Discord Defendant), Joseph Igunbor, individually and as successor-in-interest to Sofie Igunbor, Deceased (as against the TikTok, Roblox, and Discord Defendants), C.C. and G.M. (as against the Meta, Snap, TikTok, and Google Defendants), P.H. and S.B. (as against the Snap Defendant), S.D. and M.D. (as against the Meta, Snap, and TikTok Defendants), C.K. and L.K. (as against the TikTok Defendants), Olivia Parsons (as against the Meta, Snap, TikTok, and Google Defendants), I.F. (as against the Meta, Snap, TikTok, and Google Defendants), and Wesley Konnerup (as against the Google Defendants) re-allege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein, and hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 994 through 1013 of the Master Complaint.

COUNT 8:
WRONGFUL DEATH
(Against All Defendants)

321. Plaintiffs Sarah Harken, individually and as successor-in-interest to LilLee Wilkins, Deceased (as against the Meta, Snap, TikTok, and Google Defendants), Charles Hill, individually and as successor-in-interest to Zen Marchand-Hill, deceased (as against the Discord Defendant), and Joseph Igunbor, individually and as successor-in-interest to Sofie Igunbor, Deceased (as against the TikTok, Roblox, and Discord Defendants) reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein.

322. This Cause of Action is asserted by and on behalf of Plaintiffs bringing their actions as heirs of Decedents or as duly-appointed representatives of the estates of Decedents or successor-in-interests pursuant to the laws of various states.

323. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of each of the identified Defendants and the defective nature of their respective social media products as outlined above, Decedent suffered wrongful death, and Plaintiff suing as heir or estate representative of Decedent seeks damages therefor, including loss of financial support, loss of society, funeral expenses, estate administration expenses, and noneconomic damages including pain and suffering as permitted under

various states' laws, and where applicable punitive damages.

324. These Plaintiffs demand judgment against each of the Defendants for compensatory, treble, and punitive damages, together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys' fees, as permitted under various states' laws and all such other relief as the Court deems proper.

COUNT 9:
SURVIVAL ACTION
(Against All Defendants)

325. Plaintiffs Sarah Harken, individually and as successor-in-interest to LilLee Wilkins, Deceased (as against the Meta, Snap, TikTok, and Google Defendants), Charles Hill, individually and as successor-in-interest to Zen Marchand-Hill, deceased (as against the Discord Defendant), and Joseph Igunbor, individually and as successor-in-interest to Sofie Igunbor, Deceased (as against the TikTok, Roblox, and Discord Defendants) re-allege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein.

326. This Cause of Action is asserted by and on behalf of heirs of Decedents or the duly-appointed representatives of the estates of Decedents, pursuant to the laws of various states.

327. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of each of the identified Defendants and the defective nature of their respective social media products as outlined above, Decedent suffered bodily injury resulting in pre-death pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of capacity of the enjoyment of life, a shortened life expectancy, expenses for hospitalizations and other medical and nursing treatments, loss of earnings, and loss of ability to earn. Plaintiffs suing as heirs or estate representatives seek damages for these injuries to their respective Decedents as permitted under various states' laws, including where applicable punitive damages.

328. Plaintiffs demand judgment against each of the Defendants for compensatory, treble, and punitive damages, together with interest, costs of suit, attorneys' fees, as permitted under various states' law, and all such other relief as the Court deems proper.

COUNT 10:
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND SOCIETY
(Against All Defendants)

329. Plaintiffs Sarah Harken, individually and as successor-in-interest to LilLee Wilkins,

Deceased (as against the Meta, Snap, TikTok, and Google Defendants), Charles Hill, individually and as successor-in-interest to Zen Marchand-Hill, deceased (as against the Discord Defendant), and Joseph Igunbor, individually and as successor-in-interest to Sofie Igunbor, Deceased (as against the TikTok, Roblox, and Discord Defendants) re-allege and incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though set forth fully at length herein, and hereby incorporate as though set forth fully herein Paragraphs 1033 through 1036 of the Master Complaint.

V. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against each of the Defendants, jointly and severally, and as appropriate to each cause of action alleged and the standing of Plaintiffs as follows:

1. Past, present and future general damages, the exact amount of which has yet to be ascertained, in an amount which will conform to proof at time of trial, to compensate Plaintiffs for injuries sustained as a result of the use of each Defendant's respective social media products including, but not limited to physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, emotional distress, expenses for hospitalizations and medical treatments;
2. Past, present and future economic and special damages according to proof at the time of trial;
3. Loss of earnings and impaired earning capacity according to proof at the time of trial;
4. Medical expenses, past and future, according to proof at the time of trial;
5. Funeral expenses and other special damages according to proof at the time of trial;
6. Punitive or exemplary damages according to proof at the time of trial;
7. All damages available for wrongful death and survival;
8. Exemplary and punitive damages in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits;
9. Attorneys' fees;
10. For costs of suit incurred herein;

11. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law;

12. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: August 27, 2026.

SOCIAL MEDIA VICTIMS LAW CENTER

By:_____

Laura Marquez-Garrett, SBN 221542
laura@socialmediavictims.org
Matthew P. Bergman *(pro hac vice)*
matt@socialmediavictims.org
Glenn S. Draper *(pro hac vice)*
glen@socialmediavictims.org
Justin Olson (*pro hac vice)*
justin@socialmediavictims.org
SOCIAL MEDIA VICTIMS LAW CENTER
600 1st Avenue, Suite 102-PMB 2383
Seattle, WA 98104 / T: (206) 741-4862

Attorneys for Plaintiffs